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Abstract—HTTP response size is a well-known side channel
attack. With the deployment of HTTP/2.0, response size esti-
mation attacks are generally dismissed with the argument that
pipelining and response multiplexing prevent eavesdroppers from
finding out response sizes. Yet the impact that pipelining and
response multiplexing actually have in estimating HTTP response
sizes has not been adequately investigated. In this paper we set
out to help understand the effect of pipelining and response
multiplexing in estimating the size of web objects on the Internet.
We conduct an experiment that collects HTTP response sizes and
TLS record sizes from 10k popular web sites. We gather evidence
on and discuss reasons for the limited amount of pipelining and
response multiplexing used on the Internet today: only 29% of
the HTTP2 web objects we observe are pipelined and only 5%
multiplexed. We also provide worst case results under different
attack assumptions and show how effective a simple model for
estimating response sizes from TLS record sizes can be. Our
conclusion is that pipelining and especially response multiplexing
can yield, as expected, a perceivable increase in relative object size
estimation error yet the limited extent of multiplexing observed
on the Internet today and the relative simplicity of attacks to
the current pipelining mechanisms hinder their ability to help
prevent web object size estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
HTTP with TLS encryption prevents attacks that inspect
HTTP payload and signaling. HTTP response size analysis is
a well-known side-channel attack [1] that overcomes encrypted
payload inspection by using eavesdropped sizes of web objects
to identify web applications. Up to HTTP/1.1, the web client
typically waits for the response to the current HTTP request
before issuing the next request. This makes it straightforward
to find the size of HTTP responses by tapping into the TCP/IP
connection and filtering data by client-to-server and server-
to-client directions. With the deployment of HTTP/2.0 [2]
with its pipelining and multiplexing mechanisms, most authors
assume HTTP response size analysis attacks can be prevented.
With request pipelining, clients no longer need to wait for the
response to the current HTTP request to issue the next request.
With response multiplexing, servers no longer need to wait
for the end of the current response to start sending the next
response. Distinguishing web object sizes by eavesdropping
TLS record sizes should thus be unfeasible, or at least harder
than without HTTP/2.0.
Yet the extent of the effect of pipelining and multiplexing
on estimating HTTP response sizes on the Web has not been
adequately investigated. The fact that these mechanisms exist
and are deployed does not mean that they are used and that
they have an effect in response size estimation. Web content
from a web page is often not pulled from the server at once
and, if it is, HTTP signaling information may leak through
TLS to help the attacker. This means that the privacy of regular
web site users who will not have any particular reason for
using anonymity tools like Tor [3] may be more at risk than
what is believed and that the transition to HTTP/2.0 alone
may not fully prevent this risk. This is especially relevant
for the growing amount of traffic that goes through proxies
and content delivery networks that share IP addresses between
applications and for which a simple IP database lookup would
not suffice for identifying web sites and applications.
In this paper we collect network traffic that our browser
generates when opening a web page from a list of popular
web sites, which may or not be using the HTTP/2.0 protocol.
We analyze a set of empirical statistical distributions obtained
from this captured traffic and report on the details of how
the different concepts of HTTP/2.0 are used and the impact
this has on the ability of an attacker to estimate web object
sizes without having to break the TLS encryption. We provide
definitions for HTTP/2.0 concepts and for pipelining and
multiplexing in section II, which can be useful for better
understanding the rest of the paper. In section III we provide
examples of pipelining and multiplexing for a small set of web
sites and describe the evolution of pipelining and multiplexing
for that set of web sites throughout a month. Then we describe
details of the traffic capture methodology in section IV and
characterize HTTP/2.0 traffic in section V, starting with TCP
streams and HTTP/2.0 web objects and drilling down to
HTTP/2.0 frames and how they’re mapped into TLS records.
Evidence for the limited extent of pipelining and multiplexing
is presented in section VI, followed by a discussion on two
potential reasons. In particular we explore the relation between
pipelining and the number of web objects per TCP stream
and between multiplexing and the number of HTTP/2.0 frame
segments per web object. We then consider the perspective
of an attacker and define three increasingly stronger attack
assumptions in section VII. We estimate web object sizes
under each assumption and quantify the worst case error of an
attack that does no better than meeting the assumption. Finally,
we present an example of an actual attack in section VIII
where we explore TLS record size patterns for a set of server
IP addresses and their relation with HTTP/2.0 signaling. We
discuss related work in section IX and present our conclusions
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and future work in section X.
II. DEFINITIONS
Figure 1 illustrates the request-response sequence for an
HTTP/2.0 toy example with three web objects. We can observe
that the three web objects are pipelined since the request
header for the second object is sent by the client before the
response data for the first object is fully received. The same
situation happens with the second and third object. We can
also observe that the second and third objects are multiplexed
because response data for the third web object is sent before
all response data for the second object is sent by the server.
This figure also illustrates mapping of web objects to frames
and TLS records.
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Figure 1. HTTP/2.0 toy example for three web objects. Left: request and response
sequence diagram for the three objects. Right: TLS records and HTTP/2.0 frame
segments, HTTP/2.0 streams and frames for the three web objects. C2S: client to server
records, S2C: server to client records, H: header frames, D: data frames.
The rest of this section provides definitions related to
HTTP/2.0, pipelining, and multiplexing. We also include the
definition of a set of indicators related to pipelining and
multiplexing that we believe are useful for observing privacy
on the Internet.
A. HTTP/2.0
1) HTTP/2.0 web object: typically HTML, script, image, or
other web resource response data sent in an HTTP/2.0 stream
by the server.
2) HTTP/2.0 stream: defines request, response, header, data
bytes for a web object and also supports HTTP/2.0 signaling
messages.
3) HTTP/2.0 frame: encapsulates request, response, header,
and data as well as signalling for an HTTP/2.0 stream. Two
or more HTTP/2.0 frames may be needed to send request or
response bytes.
4) HTTP/2.0 frame segment: supports splitting frames and
packaging into encrypted TLS application records. One frame
segment contains an HTTP/2.0 frame or part of it. One or more
HTTP/2.0 frame segments are encapsulated in TLS application
records, which are then multiplexed on the TCP stream by the
server and the client.
B. Pipelining and Multiplexing
1) Pending requests and Active HTTP/2.0 streams: Pending
requests are HTTP/2.0 stream requests which the server has
received but not started or finishing responding to. Active
HTTP/2.0 streams are streams for which the server is in the
process of and has not finished sending header and data bytes.
A server can have pending requests and no active HTTP/2.0
streams if it has pending requests to which it did not start
responding.
2) Pipelining Segment: a set of consecutive bytes sent by
the server on a particular TCP stream containing header and
data bytes for one or more HTTP/2.0 streams and that a)
begins when a server with no prior pending requests starts
responding to a new request and b) ends when the server
sends the last bytes of all active HTTP/2.0 streams and has no
pending requests.
3) Multiplexing Segment: a set of data bytes of a Pipelining
Segment that are sent when the server has two or more active
HTTP/2.0 streams. Multiplexing segments start and finish
when the number of active HTTP/2.0 streams changes, i.e.
after sending the last bytes of an active HTTP/2.0 stream or
upon sending the first bytes of an active HTTP/2.0 stream.
The number of objects in a multiplexing segment is defined
as the number of active HTTP/2.0 streams in that segment.
4) Multiplexing Record: a TLS record that contains two
or more HTTP/2.0 frame segments from different HTTP/2.0
streams. This occurs typically with small, HTTP/2.0 signaling
and header frames.
C. NPO Network Privacy Observatory Indicators
1) HTTP/2.0 / Encrypted HTTP: Proportion of the sum
of TLS record content lengths for TLS records carrying
HTTP/2.0 frames to the sum of all TLS record content lengths.
2) Pipelining / HTTP/2.0: Proportion of the number of
bytes in pipelining segments to the sum of TLS record content
lengths for TLS records carrying HTTP/2.0 frames.
3) Multiplexing / Pipelining: Proportion of the number
of bytes in multiplexing segments to the number of bytes
pipelining segments.
III. OBSERVING PIPELINING AND MULTIPLEXING DAILY
We have been observing multiplexing and pipelining daily
on a small set of web site pages. The evolution of the NPO
indicators for the set of web page sites is shown in Figure
2. We can see that the NPO indicators are relatively stable
and do not show a tendency to increase or decrease during
the month, with HTTP/2.0 at one half, Pipelining at 4/5ths,
and Multiplexing at 1/5th. Small variation may be caused by
changes in actual number of captures performed per web site,
deviating from target of 3 daily captures per each of the 10
web sites. The May 7 capture in particular has a significant
drop in unique web sites (8/10) and captures (12/30), yet not
visibly impacting the NPO indicators more than in other days.
These results and in particular the pipelining results seem
promising. However, when we split the data by website, we
see that the results are not equally distributed per web site. The
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Figure 2. Evolution of NPO Indicators in May 2017. Top: number of unique web sites
captured in the day in proportion to the 10 target web sites (thick line), number captures
per day in proportion to 3x10 attempted captures (thin line), proportion of captures per
web site (boxes). Center: sum for all web sites of per web site average byte count. Bottom:
daily NPO indicators. In some days of the month we were not able to successfully capture
any data.
average NPO indicators for each web site and their boxplots
are shown in Figure 3. We can observe that 4 web sites have
small values for the three indicators, meaning they are not
using HTTP/2.0 greatly; and in the cases where they are,
estimating web object size is not harder than in HTTP1/1. One
web site does not use HTTP/2.0 in full, its HTTP/2.0 boxplot
showing a close to zero median and almost 0-to-1 interquartile
range. The remaining 5 web sites more fully utilize HTTP/2.0,
with smaller interquartile ranges and larger than 80% median.
Looking at the Pipelining indicator for these 5 web sites, we
see that only three have larger than 75% median and that for
the other two pipelining is only at around half. When we look
at the Multiplexing indicator the landscape is dire: no web site
has median larger than 20%.
To illustrate the variable nature of pipelining and multi-
plexing, in Figure 4 we show three diagrams of web objects,
their sizes, and the relative time at which they are sent. Each
diagram represents the web objects in a TCP stream that we
found in each of three captures of the same web site. The
first observation is that although the sizes and timings of the
web objects are not exactly the same, they are very similar
and this part of the web site is likely to be relatively static.
The second observation is that although most objects are either
pipelined, multiplexed, or not multiplexed or pipelinined in all
the three captures, some are not. If we intuitively map web
objects between the TCP streams of the three captures and
highlight objects A, B, and E, and groups C and D as shown
in Figure 4, this is more evident. Object E is pipelined in
captures 1 and 3 and not pipelined in capture 2, perhaps given
the proximity in time to the objects in group D in captures
1 and 3. Arguments for why some objects are pipelined in
some captures and multiplexed in others end there. Object A
is multiplexed in capture 3 but not capture 1, when neighboring
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Figure 3. NPO Indicators per web site: average (top) and boxplot diagrams (bottom
three).
objects (B, C, and the two pipelined objects before A) do not
change much between these captures. In capture 3 objects A
and C seem to be multiplexed together, while in capture 2 this
seems to happen with A and B.
IV. EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY
The basis for the remaining of this work is a set of HTTPS
requests issued on January 2017 to the first 10k of Alexa’s
top 1M web site pages [4]. We prepend the "https://" prefix
to each of the 10k Alexa’s web site page names and load
this URL in the browser. For each web site page we collect a
tcpdump capture for all incoming and outgoing traffic through
the client’s Ethernet interface. We also save a file with the pre-
master secrets from the browser on each capture, which we
then use to decrypt TLS records in the tcpdump pcap capture
files. This is critical for the validation of our work as we
can know exactly which part of the HTTP/2.0 streams each
TLS record carries. Because of the complexity of web site
pages, the HTTPS request for each of the 10k web sites will
likely cause the browser to issue other HTTPS and non-HTTPS
requests to the same and other server IP addresses. We use
the pre-master secrets to parse the pcap files and populate a
database with TLS records, HTTP/2.0 frames, and HTTP/2.0
streams. With this information we are able to characterize the
extent of HTTP/2.0 pipelining and multiplexing and assess the
success of an attack.
We use tcpdump 4.7.4 to capture pcap traffic files, tshark
2.2.5 to parse pcap files, and Chromium 57.0 on Ubuntu 16.04
desktop Linux with Selenium python webdriver 3.3.3 to open
web pages.
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Figure 4. Web object size, time, pipelining, and multiplexing for three TCP streams
of three different captures of the same web site and that appear to carry the same web
objects. Web objects are marked with asterisk if they are pipelined, asterisk and circle if
they are multiplexed, and a plus sign if they’re not pipelined or multiplexed. Web objects
A, B, and E as well as groups C and D are marked out in the three captures.
V. WEB TRAFFIC CHARACTERIZATION
Approximately 30% of traffic bytes from our data set are
not TLS encrypted and can be analyzed directly. 40% of
the traffic bytes are from prior versions of HTTP/2.0, which
do not fully support pipelining and multiplexing and that
mostly follow a simple sequential request-reply protocol that
is straightforward to attack. Only 30% of the traffic bytes are
used for HTTP/2.0 and thus potentially offer pipelining and
multiplexing protection to response size attacks.
A. HTTP/2.0 Server IP Addresses, TCP Streams, Web Objects
We counted 75k TCP streams that send HTTP/2.0 frames
for 145k HTTP/2.0 web objects from 2.8k distinct server IP
addresses. The distributions of the number of TCP streams per
distinct server IP address for the whole experiment is heavy-
tailed. 50% of the distinct server IP addresses have only one
or two TCP streams each, whereas the top 1% of server IP
addresses have more than 42% of the 75k TCP streams. The
largest number of TCP streams per server IP address is 2334.
This may relate to the popularity of the content available in
some servers throughout the set of 10k web sites for which
we captured traffic.
We also found that one third of the TCP streams do not carry
any data or header frames but only HTTP/2.0 signalling frames
such as SETTINGS or WINDOW_UPDATE. Only 49k TCP
streams from 2.5k distinct server IP addresses actually carry
web objects. The largest number of web objects downloaded
from a single TCP connection is 541, the top 1% of TCP
streams have 19% of the web objects, and more than 60%
of the TCP streams have only one web object, totaling 18%
of the web objects. This means that 18% of the web objects
carried in the 30% of traffic bytes that fully support pipelining
and multiplexing are not multiplexed or pipelined - as they do
not share a TCP stream with other web objects.
B. Web Object Size and HTTP/2.0 Frame Size
Figure 5 shows the distribution of web object sizes and how
this changes with the number of frames per object. 45% of the
web objects are delivered in a single HTTP/2.0 frame, 18%
in two HTTP/2.0 frames, and the remaining 37% in three or
more HTTP/2.0 frames. As expected, the single-frame web
object sizes tend to be smaller than two-frame and three or
more-frame web objects. However we notice that 1) half of
the single frame web objects are larger than 1k bytes, some
reaching 10k bytes and 2) more than 20% web objects are
sent in two frames even if their size is relatively small, below
1k bytes.
Figure 5. Distribution of the sizes of web objects.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of HTTP/2.0 frame sizes
and how this changes with the number of segments per frame.
35% of the frames are delivered in a single HTTP/2.0 frame
segment, 15% in two HTTP/2.0 frame segments, 22% in 12
frame segments, and 14% in 13 HTTP/2.0 frame segments.
The largest observed frame size is 16384 bytes, which ac-
cording to the standard corresponds to the smallest possible
maximum frame size setting for HTTP/2.0 [5].
Figure 6. Distribution of the sizes of HTTP/2.0 response data frames.
C. TLS records and HTTP/2.0 Frame Segments
We collected over 8.6 million TLS records, from which
4.1 million are HTTP/2.0 application records and 3.7 million
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HTTP/2.0 application records sent by the server. We observe
that most TLS records are either used to send data frames
or non-data frames. In fact, only 1% of server-to-client TLS
records have both data and non-data frame segments. 3.29
million TLS records are used to send HTTP/2.0 data frames
and 145k TLS records to send header HTTP/2.0 frames.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of TLS record and HTTP
frame segment sizes, for either data or header frames. Most
data HTTP/2.0 frame segments are 1381 and 1389 bytes
long, corresponding to TLS record sizes of 1405 bytes and
1413 bytes, respectively. This could be related to cross-layer
interaction between IP MTU and TLS record size.
From the TLS application records that encapsulate server-to-
client HTTP/2.0 data frames, 94% encapsulate one HTTP/2.0
data frame segment. The difference between TLS record size
and the size of the HTTP/2.0 frame segment it carries is 24
bytes for an overwhelming 96% of data frame records, mostly
due to the (TLS record, frame segment) size pairs (1381, 1405)
and (1389, 1413) that take up 86% of the single frame TLS
records. There is also a 24 byte difference for 74% of the
other single frame TLS records. More than 99% of the TLS
records that encapsulate HTTP/2.0 header frames are single
frame segment records and 97% out of those have a 33 byte
difference between TLS record size and HTTP frame segment
size.
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VI. EXTENT OF PIPELINING AND MULTIPLEXING
Figure 8 shows that the extent of HTTP/2.0, Pipelining,
and Multiplexing usage is relatively small: 1) more than 35%
of web site captures have no HTTP/2.0 bytes, 2) more than
70% have no pipelined bytes, and 3) more than 90% have
no multiplexed bytes. This means that for the more than
70% of the captures (which do not have pipelined bytes)
figuring out the size of all web objects is no more difficult
than in encrypted HTTP/1.0. The extent of pipelining and
multiplexing is foremost related to the adoption of HTTP/2.0.
We expect the extent of pipelining and of multiplexing to
increase as this adoption increases1. Captures with strong (>
75%) pipelining or multiplexing effect are small in number:
only 1% of the captures for strong pipelining, 0.3% for
strong multiplexing, and 0.08% for both strong pipelining and
multiplexing.
1http://isthewebhttp2yet.com
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Overall, only 42.7k web objects were pipelined and 7.4k
multiplexed, out of 145k. We found 110k pipelining segments
in our data set, 92% of which contain data for a single
HTTP/2.0 stream, 4% for two streams, and the remaining 4%
for 3 or more streams. The largest 60 pipelining segments have
20 or more HTTP/2.0 streams. We also found 9k multiplexing
segments, half of which with two HTTP/2.0 streams. The
largest 70 multiplexing segments have 20 or more HTTP/2.0
streams.
A. Pipelining and the number of web objects per TCP stream
Out of the 49k TCP streams that carry web objects, 29k
carry only one web object. As pipelining requires at least
two web objects, this immediately leaves out 29k web objects
from pipelining. The question for these 29k web objects
then becomes whether the web client is opening a new TCP
connection to the same server IP address for each web object
that it has to retrieve from that server or does it only request
one web object from that server throughout the capture of the
web site traffic. It turns out that 16.7k web objects could not
have been pipelined as they are the only web object requested
from their server IP address in the web site traffic capture.
The remaining 12.3k could have been pipelined, depending
on the specifics of how the web site redirects the web browser
to subsequent HTTP requests and if the web client opened
a single TCP connection for all objects in that server IP
address. Additionally, 13.6k TCP streams carry two or more
non-pipelined web objects, totaling 54.5k web objects that
could also have been pipelined depending on the specifics of
the web site.
We observe that the extent of pipelining is much stronger
for web objects between 1k and 10k bytes than for other sizes.
48% of 33k web objects with size in range ]1k, 10k] are
pipelined compared to 26% of 67k web objects larger than
10k, 25% of 24k web objects with size in range ]100, 1k],
and 18% of 18k web objects with size in range ]10, 100].
Figure 9 shows the number of web objects in the same TCP
stream as a given object, grouped by that object’s size. We
can observe that in the ]1k, 10k] range, in which the extent
of pipelining is stronger, the number of web objects per TCP
stream is larger than for other ranges. This seems to support
the following: the more web objects there are in a TCP stream,
5
the stronger will the pipelining effect be. The precise timing
of the object requests should of course also be of relevance.
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B. Multiplexing and the number of HTTP/2.0 frame segments
per pipelined web object
Out of 42.7k pipelined web objects, 14.3k have a single
HTTP/2.0 frame segment. If by chance the single HTTP/2.0
frame segment objects are sent by the server in the middle of
other, multi-HTTP/2.0 frame segment web objects, then they
will be part of a multiplexing segment. This happens to only
1.7k of the single-HTTP/2.0 frame segment web objects.
Out of the remaining 28.4k web objects with two or more
HTTP/2.0 segments, 22.7k objects are not multiplexed. This
is extremely interesting as there does not appear to be any
obvious reason why pipelined web objects with more than one
HTTP/2.0 frame segment should not be multiplexed. Having
received requests for two or more web objects in the pipelining
segment and with more than two HTTP/2.0 frame segments
to send, the server should be able to round robin the frame
segments and multiplex the web objects. In a majority of cases
(22.7k out of 28.4k) it does not. This contributes to the small
extent of multiplexing.
The extent of multiplexing for smaller web objects is much
smaller than for larger sizes. From 6% for web objects larger
than 10k and 8% for web objects with size in range ]1k,
10k], multiplexing drops to 2% for web objects with size in
range ]100, 1k] and to 0.3% for range ]10,100]. This could be
explained by the number of single HTTP/2.0 frame segment
web objects in web object size ranges: 95% of the web objects
in size range ]10, 100] have a single HTTP/2.0 frame segment,
80% in range ]100, 1k], 40% in range ]1k, 10k], and only 4%
for web objects larger than 10k bytes. Smaller web objects
seem to be multiplexed to smaller extent than others because
they mostly have single HTTP/2.0 frame segment.
VII. ATTACK ASSUMPTIONS AND WORST CASE RESULTS
Worst case attack results can be characterized by defining
the boundary for which the attacker cannot do worse in
underestimating or overestimating web object size, according
to some attack assumptions. We define a set of attack assump-
tions and provide results for worst case attacks under each
assumption. Our rationale is that 1) best case attacks would
always be able to predict web object sizes accurately so there
is no point in defining best case boundaries here and 2) if the
resulting worst case boundary turns out to be good enough
for the attacker, then the only thing that the attacker needs is
to meet the assumption in order to be successful. We start by
showing that even without pipelining estimating the size of
web objects is not free of error and establish a no-pipelining
baseline to better understand the impact of pipelining and
multiplexing.
A. Estimating Web Object Size Without Pipelining
For the 102k web objects that are not pipelined it is
straightforward to estimate their size. For non-pipelined web
objects, the client issues the request for the object and has to
wait for the server to send the web object before it sends a
new request. Thus we simply need to sum the sizes of server-
to-client TLS records between client-to-server TLS records.
However, this sum will almost never be exactly equal to
the size of the web object: TLS records carrying the web
object have encryption overhead and may include HTTP/2.0
signaling.
We take object size sact and estimated size sest as the sum
of all TLS records that contain frame segments of that object
and compute error e = (sest − sact)/(sact). Figure 10 shows
the distribution of error e for different ranges of web object
size sact. Larger web objects have smaller relative error and
very small (< 100 bytes) web objects have extremely large
error. Objects smaller than 10 bytes have all error e larger
than 10.
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Figure 10. Cumulative distributions of non-pipelined web object estimate error for
different ranges of web object sizes (in bytes)
B. Attack Assumptions
Assumption 1: The positions of the beginning and end bytes
of all pipelining segments are known, as well as the number
of web objects in each pipelining segment.
Assumption 2: The positions of the beginning and end bytes
of all multiplexing segments are known, as well as the number
of web objects in each multiplexing segment.
Assumption 3: The TLS records that carry each HTTP/2.0
stream are known.
Assumption 3 is the strongest assumption and covers
pipelining and multiplexing segments. Assumption 2 covers
pipelining segments only. Assumption 1 is the weakest as-
sumption, only covering client-server requests and not pipelin-
ing or multiplexing segments. Multiplexing records are not
covered by any of the assumptions and we believe this would
require breaking the encoding on the TLS records.
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Our three assumptions yield high and low value estimates.
The worst case estimates sest are computed using the high
or low value estimate that yields the largest error e. In each
of the assumptions and in the case where two or more web
objects are in the same segment (or record in the case of
assumption 3), we additionally assume that all web objects in
the segment/record are extremely small except for one, which
is dominant and has approximately the size of the pipelining
segment. Since the exact dominant web object is not assumed
to be known, the high value estimate for all web objects in
the segment/record is the size of the segment/record and the
low value estimate is zero. In the case of single web object
segment/record, both the high and low value estimates are
equal to the size of the segment/record.
For assumptions 1 and 3 we additionally require that the
request header size is known so that it can yield a value for
sest that considers only the data part of the server response.
C. Worst Case Results
We provide results per assumption broken down by web
object size in Figure 11 and per web object size broken down
by assumption in Figure 12.
We can see from Figure 11 that in general and for the
different assumptions, larger web objects have smaller relative
error. The impact of the mechanisms that can affect estimated
web object size (like pipelining and multiplexing segments,
multiplexing TLS records, and TLS encoding overhead) seems
not to grow as much as the web object size. Figure 10 shows
the error for non-pipelined web objects and also supports this
intuition. One exception is the case of web objects between
1k and 10k under assumption A1. The worse error distribution
in this size range is likely due to the proportion of pipelined
web objects, which in this range is almost twice as much than
in other ranges.
Figure 12 shows that the error is relatively small under
weaker assumption A1 and for larger web objects. Under
assumption A1, 70% of web objects larger than 10k have an
error smaller than 2%, while 50% of web objects between
1k and 10k have an error smaller than 10%. Figure 12 also
shows that A2 and A3 curves are very close to each other.
An attacker would thus not be required to meet stronger A3
assumption but only A2 to have worst case results similar to
A3. Overall we observe a more extensive use of pipelining
and multiplexing that can bring the error curves closer to the
bottom right part of the CDFs, especially for 1k and larger
web objects.
D. Results for Pipelining and Multiplexing Objects Only
The previous section provides worst case results for non-
pipelined, pipelined, and multiplexed objects together under
the different attack assumptions. Here we focus on pipelined
and multiplexed web objects only, in order to better gauge
the effect of pipelining and multiplexing. Figure 13 shows
how strong the pipelining and multiplexing effects are by
comparing worst case results for the weaker assumption that
covers the effect (A2 for pipelining and A3 for multiplexing)
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Figure 11. Error of worst case assumptions, broken down by assumption: A1, A2, A3
from top to bottom.
with the strongest assumption that does not cover the effect
(A1 for pipelining and A2 for multiplexing).
VIII. EXAMPLE ATTACK
In the previous section we defined attack assumptions and
discussed worst case results without proposing a specific
attack. In this section we provide an illustrative example of
an attack that meets a weaker form of Assumption 2 in which
the number of web objects in each segment is not known. This
attack, however, is only valid for some server IP addresses.
A. Description
Our example attack has two parts. In the first part we
address the feature in HTTP/1.1 and beyond that allows a TCP
connection to be reused for multiple requests. We segment
the TLS records of each TCP connection into sets of HTTP
request-response sequences that are contained entirely in each
segment. Our assumption in segmenting TCP connections
is that the TLS records of ready-to-send HTTP responses
are sent back-to-back. We look for gaps in the sequence of
timestamps of these records and use these gaps to segment the
TCP connections. In HTTP/1.1 a gap will exist between the
timestamp of the last TLS record of the current response and
the timestampt of the first TLS record of the next response.
This gap is at least one round trip time, as the client has
to wait until the the current response is completely received
before sending the next request. More generically in order to
include pipelining and response multiplexing, we take a gap
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Figure 12. Error of worst case assumptions, broken down by web object size: > 10k ,
]1k,10k], ]100,1k], ]10,100] from top to bottom.
in the back-to-back TLS record sequences from the server as
indication that all requests sent by the client and received by
the server up to that point have been served. We declare a
gap in the TCP connection when the difference between the
timestamps of consecutive TLS records from the server is 1)
larger than 0.5 seconds or 2) larger than 20 times the average
back-to-back response gap from the server, normalized to a
1500 byte TLS record size.
In the second part we analyze the sets of HTTP request-
response of the segmented TCP connections to compute re-
sponse sizes. A basic approach would not consider pipelining
and multiplexing and simply take the sum of all TLS record
sizes from the server on each segment of the TCP connection
as an estimate of HTTP response size. The approach that
considers pipelining to estimate HTTP response sizes relies on
our intuition on the following three side-channel information
that leak from TLS. 1) HTTP/2.0 signaling is visible through
small-sized TLS records (less than 60 bytes) that indicate the
beginning of an HTTPS connection or the beginning or end of
an HTTP response. 2) Large HTTP responses generate back-
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Figure 13. Comparison of estimation error e for pipelined (top) and multiplexed
(bottom) web objects. For pipelined web objects we compare assumption A2 which
covers pipelining with weaker assumption A1 which only covers client-server requests.
For multiplexed web objects we compare assumption A3 which covers multiplexing with
weaker assumption A2 which only covers pipelining.
to-back TLS records with relatively large size corresponding
to network (∼ 1.5 kB) or TLS (∼ 16 kB) MTUs. 3) Request
and response headers are sent in their own TLS records,
typically yielding record sizes smaller than the MTU. We
use this information to estimate the start and finish times for
HTTP responses. With start and finish times it is possible
to identify segments in the TLS record size sequences that
contain entire responses – some of which will be pipelined
but not multiplexed while others will be entirely or partially
multiplexed. We sum all TLS record sizes to get an estimate of
non-multiplexed responses and ignore multiplexed responses.
In a previous experiment [6] we found that HTTP/2.0
connections from the same type of server IP addresses have the
a same initial sequence of server-to-client TLS record sizes.
After inspecting captures of one of these types of server IP
address, we decided to use the following information for our
attack:
• HTTP request and response headers are sent in TLS
records with sizes ranging from 70 to 350 bytes.
• 41 byte-length TLS records from the server indicate that
a response has finished.
The output of the estimation process is a list of sizes and
start and finish positions of estimated responses per TCP
stream from each web server.
B. Target Characterization
Our attack is only suitable for some server IP addresses.
We found 47.7k target TCP streams from 388 unique server
IP addresses that match our attack target’s initial sequence of
TLS record sizes. From these only 33.9k TCP streams actually
carry web objects - a total of 87.9k web objects, from which
10.8k are pipelined and 0.5k are multiplexed. Like in the case
of the whole data set, attack target web objects larger than 10k
bytes are the largest group with 53% of the web objects; 13%
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of the attack target web objects have sizes between 1k and 10k,
20% between 100 and 1k, and 13% between 10 and 100 bytes.
Unlike the whole data set, the proportion of pipelined web
objects to the number of web objects in the different ranges
is smaller: 19% for size range ]10,100], 12% for ]100,1k],
15% for ]1k,10k] and 9% for web objects larger than 10k.
The largest proportion for pipelining is in the range ]10,100],
while for the whole data set this is range ]1k, 10k].
C. Number of Web Objects
Our attack found 92.7k web objects, 4.8k more than the
number of web objects in the target TCP streams. This
difference can be explained in three parcels. 1) Our attack
found 1.1k web objects in 0.8k TCP streams that do not carry
web objects, resulting in an additional 1.1k web objects. 2)
Our attack was able to find the correct number of web objects
in 28.8k TCP streams. The attack underestimated the number
of web objects in 2.3k TCP streams, mostly (96%) by only one
web object less. The attack overestimated the number of web
objects in a similar number of TCP streams (2.3k), however
with 30.0% of the attacks to TCP streams yielding 3 or more
web objects than the actual number. The difference between
the number of overestimated (6.9k) and underestimated (2.5k)
web objects is an additional 4.3k web objects. 3) Finally, the
attack did not find any web objects for 0.4k TCP streams
that do carry web objects; this corresponds to 0.6k fewer web
objects. Summing parcels 1 and 2 and subtracting parcel 3
results in the 4.8k more objects found in the attack.
We now try to understand the difference between the
number of web objects in a TCP stream and the number of
web objects found in the attack to that stream, which we call
Attack. To do so, we explore the relation between Attack and
the number of pipelined and multiplexed objects in each TCP
stream. Figure 14 shows a stronger correlation between the
Attack variable and the number of multiplexed objects than
with the number of pipelined objects. The CDFs in Figure 14
confirm this; the difference between the Attack distributions
for TCP streams with and without multiplexing is larger than
for TCP streams with and without pipelining. This makes
sense since our attack is related to Assumption 2 that covers
pipelining but not multiplexing.
D. Web Object Size
We take all TCP streams for which our attack resulted in
the correct number of web objects in the stream and analyze
the error of the web object sizes found in the attack. To map
the web object sizes found in the attack with the actual web
objects in the TCP stream we order both sets of response sizes
by header response timestamp and assign the first web object
found in the attack to the first web object in the stream, and
so forth. We then take estimated web object size and actual
web object size and apply error e as defined in section VII-A.
Figure 15 shows the resulting distributions of error e, grouped
by web object size and whether the web object was pipelined,
multiplexed, or neither.
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We observe that non-pipelined and pipelined object error
distributions are very similar. The exception are the distribu-
tions for web objects smaller than 100 bytes, which cause the
difference between pipelined and non-pipelined distributions
for all objects between e = 1.0 and e = 1.5. The error
distributions for pipelined web objects are much closer to zero
than the error distribution for multiplexed objects. For web
object sizes larger than 1k in particular, the distributions for
pipelined object error e are extremely close to zero - more than
94% of web objects larger than 1k have error e smaller than
6% and more than 95% larger than 10k have error smaller than
3%. Distributions for multiplexed objects show higher error
than for non-pipelined and pipelined objects. This is expected
given that our attack is related to assumption 2 which covers
pipelining but not multiplexing.
IX. RELATED WORK
We are not aware of any related work that tries to under-
stand the effect of pipelining and response multiplexing in
estimating HTTP/2.0 response sizes. The extent of pipelining
and multiplexing on a set of web pages on the Internet is also
not discussed in any work that we are aware of. In this section
we go through related work in areas close to other aspects of
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our work – namely side channel attacks on encrypted channels
and response size estimation.
A. Encrypted Channels
Many side channel attacks have been proposed on different
encrypted channels. A decade ago, and motivated by the CPU-
intensive nature of application traffic classification techniques
such as snort [7] and by the legal difficulties of analyzing
traffic content, researchers started using features of the traffic
that did not rely on its content – namely packet size, direction,
and timing [8]. Quickly researchers realized these features
could be used together with machine learning techniques [9] to
classify encrypted traffic, which snort cannot not. Experiments
for classifying SSH-tunneled application traffic [10] or identi-
fying HTTPS webmail traffic [11] have been motivated mostly
by network management requirements, for example the need
to provide different quality of service for applications with
different traffic requirements, which existing methods were
unable to do for encrypted traffic.
Another and possibly more pressing motivation for side
channel attacks on encrypted channels is an attack on user
privacy and the possibility that some information related to
application data and user behavior is leaked through the
channel, which could be used against its owner. The channel
that possibly raises most privacy concerns is TOR [12], which
is designed precisely to protect user anonymity. Numerous
attacks on TOR have been reported [13], [14] focusing for
example on ingress-egress traffic correlation, the specifics of
the TOR onioning protocol including circuits and layers, and
active attacks from compromised browser or TOR nodes.
The goal for attacks on TOR could be inferring the type of
application being used [15] or identifying the user. Attacks
to more traditional VPN tunnels with the aim of identifying
web pages have been described [16] and use traffic features
such as burst size and surge period. Encrypted voice and video
traffic using voice- and video-specific protocols has also been
subject to side channel attacks, with the intent of uncovering
spoken sentences in encrypted VoIP communications [17] or
identifying the video that a user last watched [18]. Finally,
privacy attacks on wireless channels have also been reported,
focusing e.g. on mobile application traffic classification over
WLAN with WPA2 encryption [19] and on commercial smart
home sensors with 802.15.4 wireless interfaces [20]. Attacks
on wireless channels are especially motivating as the attacker
is not required to enter private target premises and unlawfully
tap the target network.
Recently, one of the major aspects of network management
– security – is starting to again drive side-channel attack re-
search. As network managers face increasingly more encrypted
traffic transiting their networks which they do not have access
or authorization to decrypt – either from customers or different
departments in their organization, so grows the relevance
of side channel attack techniques to identify intrusions over
encrypted traffic. This may be especially relevant in a cloud en-
vironment where tenants deploy wide range of modern HTTP
applications or in an IoT environment where HTTPS-capable
yet resource-limited and possibly less frequently updated smart
devices receive sensor and actuation requests from anywhere
on the Internet.
HTTP over TLS is possibly the mostly used of encrypted
channels. We cover HTTP over TLS next, focusing on web
object response sizes and how they can be estimated by an
attacker.
B. Estimating Response Size and Identifying Web Sites
A in-depth and interesting discussion on size-exposing tech-
niques can be found in [21]. Starting with the initial warnings
that eavesdropping encrypted communications could reveal
information about its content [22] and examples of attacks
to identify web sites using fingerprinting [1], the authors
are quick to focus on online social networks. In addition to
identifying which web page the user is accessing, the state of
the user could be inferred using the set of web resources that
social network web sites send over the Internet. Estimating
the size of web objects can now have much more severe
consequences than a decade or two ago as it more directly
exposes the user.
[23] illustrates the possibly high impact consequences of
estimating response sizes in health-care, tax, investment, and
online search web sites. Earlier, [24] had shown that very good
performance could be achieved in an attack to identify web
sites from a set of 100k different sites, although web pages
with dynamic content could be a problem. Although the issue
of identifying dynamic web pages has been addressed since
that [16], it remains an open issue given the limited set of web
pages that was studied. [21] provides a more detailed study
on dynamic pages and are able to retrieve the exact size of
web objects but their solution requires an active attack to be
performed, which may not always be feasible.
Pipelining is referred to in [24] as a mechanism that
could prevent web object size estimation. However, at that
time pipelining was not used despite having been defined in
the HTTP protocol. Otherwise, related work assumes it is
straightforward to obtain adequate estimations of web object
sizes from the stream of TLS records.
X. CONCLUSION
The effect of pipelining and multiplexing on the estimation
of web object sizes yields a perceivable increase in the relative
object size estimation error. However, 1) attacking pipelining
is viable as we’ve shown for some server IP addresses and
2) the current extent of multiplexing – and to a lesser degree
that of pipelining – is limited. These two issues suggest that
despite the potential of pipelining and multiplexing, their use
needs to increase if they’re to better help prevent web object
size estimation.
We see many interesting related research issues ahead. The
first issue is to understand to which extent it is possible to
automatically detect new types of web servers and attacks, e.g.
by correlating TLS record sizes with the beginning and end
of HTTP responses. The second issue is to better understand
why pipelining and multiplexing are used or not in apparently
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similar circumstances and for different captures of the same
sequence of requests. We plan to develop a controlled environ-
ment where pipelining and multiplexing can be adjusted and
different web applications can be installed. This will also allow
us to observe the trade-off between object size estimation and
quality of service. This leads to the third research issue which
is to explore different countermeasures at the web engine,
web application, browser, and service provider that can reduce
the effectiveness of web object size estimation. Finally, the
fourth research issue we see is related to measuring the effect
of pipelining and multiplexing in reducing the efficiency of
web page identification, for example using attack data and
developing features that consider specific temporal sequences
of web object sizes in each TCP stream.
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